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10,318 words 
Evaluating the illegal employer practice of under-UHSRUWLQJHPSOR\HHV¶
salaries  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper advances understanding of the prevalence and distribution of the illegal employer 
practice of under-reporting HPSOR\HHV¶salaries, explains this practice and evaluates policy 
approaches. Analysing a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of 11,025 employees in 28 European 
countries, one in 33 employees receive under-reported salaries, mostly in small businesses 
and vulnerable groups (e.g., unskilled workers, with lower education levels and financial 
difficulties). Explaining this practice not as an individual criminal act that increasing the risk 
of detection can tackle, but as a symptom of systemic problems, which require improvements 
both in tax morale at the individual-level and in the formal institutional environment at the 
country-level to resolve, we then discuss the implications for theory and policy. 
 
Key words: informal economy; informal employment; undeclared economy; envelope wages; 
tax compliance; tax evasion; European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
Understanding illegal labour practices lies at the very heart of the study of industrial relations. 
Unless the various illegal labour practices pursued by employers to reduce their labour costs 
are tackled, such as the use of undeclared labour and sub-contracting WR WKH µbogus self-
HPSOR\HG¶, the result will be a diminution of state control over the quality of working 
conditions, weakened trade union and collective bargaining and pressure on legitimate 
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businesses to evade regulatory compliance due to the unfair competition (Andrews et al. 
2011; ILO 2014; TUC 2008). To advance understanding of illegal labour practices, this paper 
evaluates the fraudulent employer practice of under-reporting HPSOR\HHV¶ VDODULHV to the 
authorities in order to evade their full social insurance and tax liabilities (Chavdarova 2014; 
Williams 2009; Woolfson 2007). The aim is to analyse the prevalence and distribution of this 
practice, to explain its existence and explore how to tackle it.  
Here, therefore, we advance understanding of illegal wage practices in three ways. 
From an empirical viewpoint, we report Eurobarometer survey data from 28 member states to 
determine the prevalence and distribution of salary under-reporting. Secondly, and 
theoretically, we then explain its prevalence and distribution as a symptom of not only 
individual-level variables, notably the acceptability of non-compliance, but also systemic 
problems by documenting the country-level determinants that lead to its greater prevalence. 
Finally, and from a policy perspective, we show how the currently dominant deterrence 
approach based on improving detection does not reduce this illegal wage practice. Instead, 
tackling this illegal wage practice requires a more indirect approach that both changes 
attitudes towards compliance at the individual-level and resolves specific systemic problems 
at the country-level that lead to its greater prevalence.  
To show this, section 2 briefly reviews the previous literature on the illegal practice of 
under-reporting formal HPSOR\HHV¶ VDODULHV The outcome will be a set of hypotheses 
regarding the association between salary under-reporting and who engages at the individual-
level, whether under-development, over-interference or under-intervention by the state causes 
salary under-reporting and how to tackle this practice. To test these hypotheses, section 3 then 
reports the data used, namely a 2013 Eurobarometer survey comprising 11,025 face-to-face 
interviews with formal employees in the 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28), 
and the analytical methods employed; a staged multi-level logistic regression model utilizing 
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the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within countries). Section 4 reports the findings 
regarding the association between salary under-reporting at both an individual- and country-
level and who does it, whether under-development, under- or over-regulation determines the 
level of salary under-reporting and what needs to be done to reduce it. Section 5 then 
discusses the theoretical and policy implications of the findings along with the limitations and 
future research required.   
 
2. Illegal under-reporting of wages 
Over the past decade, a small but growing literature has drawn attention to how formal 
employers often reduce their tax and social security payments and therefore labour costs by 
paying their formal employees two salaries; an official declared salary and an additional 
XQGHFODUHGµHQYHORSH¶ZDJHZKLFKLVhidden from the authorities for tax and social security 
purposes. The instigation of this illegal labour practice usually occurs at the job interview 
stage. Alongside the agreement to pay an official declared wage detailed in a formal written 
contract, the employer at the same time reaches a verbal unwritten agreement with the 
employee to pay an additional µenvelope wage¶ not declared to the authorities for tax and 
social security purposes (Chavdarova 2014; Williams 2009; Woolfson 2007). Salary under-
reporting thus arises from fraudulent labour contracts where the conditions in the written 
contract differ to that verbally agreed. Unless the employee agrees to these conditions, then 
generally they do not get the job. These conditions include: that the employee will not take 
their full statutory entitlement to annual leave; that they will work longer hours than in their 
formal contract (which often means working more than the maximum hours in the working 
hours directive and/or being paid less than the minimum hourly wage), and/or that they will 
have a different tasks and responsibilities to that specified in their formal contract (Williams 
2014a). This verbal contract supersedes the formal written contract of employment in that it 
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cRQVWLWXWHV WKHXQZULWWHQ µSV\FKRORJLFDO FRQWUDFW¶ UHJDUGLQJ WKHLU FRQGLWLRQVRI HPSOR\PHQW
(Rousseau 1995). Although verbal agreements in many countries are legal and hold the same 
weight in law as a written contract, this particular verbal contract to under-report salaries is 
illegal because it fraudulently under-reports the wage earned by the employee in order to 
evade the full tax and social security payments owed by the employee and employer.  
 
Prevalence and distribution of salary under-reporting 
Currently, little evidence exists on the prevalence and distribution of this illegal wage practice 
due to the small-scale qualitative nature of previous studies, conducted largely in East-Central 
European nations such as Bulgaria (Chavdarova 2014), Estonia (Meriküll and Staehr 2010), 
Latvia (Kukk and Staehr 2014; Meriküll and Staehr 2010; OECD 2003; Putni৆ã and Sauka 
2015; Sedlenieks 2003), Lithuania (Meriküll and Staehr 2010; Sasunkevich 2014; Woolfson 
2007), Romania (Neef 2002), Russia (Kapelyushnikov et al. 2012; Williams and Round 2007) 
and Ukraine (Round et al. 2008; Williams 2007). For instance, in Lithuania, Woolfson (2007) 
provides an in-depth case study of one person, albeit a cause celebre, whilst Sedlenieks 
(2003) in Latvia reports 15 face-to-face interviews conducted in Riga. Meanwhile, Williams 
(2007) in Ukraine interviews 600 households but only in three localities, whilst Williams and 
Round (2007) in Russia interview 313 households but only in three districts of Moscow. 
These studies, therefore, cannot document its prevalence and distribution.   
Nevertheless, they do provide clues to the extensiveness of this practice. For example, 
in Ukraine, 30 per cent of formal employees reported receiving an envelope wage from their 
formal employer (Williams 2007) and 65 per cent in Moscow (Williams and Round 2007). A 
survey repeated in 1998 and 2002 involving 900 interviews similarly reveals that 19.5 per 
cent of employees received envelope wages in 1998 and 9.6 per cent in 2002 in Estonia, 16.3 
per cent and 22.5 per cent respectively in Latvia and 7.2 per cent and 11.7 per cent in 
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Lithuania (Meriküll and Staehr 2010). However, these studies undertaken in post-socialist 
societies at the height of the transition process do not reflect the current position in East-
Central Europe and beyond.  
 Which employee groups receive envelope wages and which businesses are more likely 
to pay such wages? Synthesising the qualitative data and vignettes of individuals receiving 
such envelope wages in the small-scale qualitative and/or locality studies provides some 
clues. They view this as an employer- rather than employee-instigated wage practice (Round 
et al. 2008), concentrated amongst small business owners (Sasunkevich 2014) and largely 
vulnerable groups of employees, such as younger age groups amongst whom unemployment 
is high, lower-income employees, unskilled manual workers, and often women rather than 
men (Chavdarova 2014; Sedlenieks 2003). Similar findings result from the descriptive 
findings of the relatively larger, mostly country-level, studies which identify that younger 
persons and the lower paid are more likely to receive envelope wages and smaller rather than 
larger firms to engage in this illegal practice (Williams 2007; Williams and Round 2007; 
Williams and Padmore 2013). Based on these tentative findings therefore, we here test the 
following propositions: 
 
H1a: Women are more likely to receive envelope wages than men. 
H1b: Those with financial difficulties are more likely to receive envelope wages than 
those without financial difficulties. 
H1c: Younger age groups are more likely to receive envelope wages than older age 
groups. 
H1d: Unskilled manual workers are more likely to receive envelope wages than more 
skilled and professional workers. 
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H1e: Workers with fewer years in formal education are more likely to receive 
envelope wages than those who spent longer in formal education. 
H1f: Smaller businesses are more likely to under-report salaries than larger firms. 
 
Explaining salary under-reporting 
Most studies simply describe the prevalence and character of this illegal wage practice. In the 
only previous study to seek explanations for this practice, Williams (2014b) draws upon three 
theories of the wider undeclared economy to understand salary under-reporting.  
Firstly, the µPRGHUQLsDWLRQ¶WKHVLVexplains the undeclared economy as a leftover from 
a pre-modern mode of production and as becoming less prevalent with economic development 
and modernisation (Lewis 1959; La Porta and Schleifer 2014). From this viewpoint, therefore, 
the prevalence of salary under-reporting will be greater in less developed economies, 
measured in terms of GNP per capita, and societies lacking modern state bureaucracies.  
Secondly, a group of mostly neo-liberal scholars DGRSW D µVWDWH RYHU-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶
thesis. This explains undeclared work as resulting from a rational economic decision to 
voluntarily exit the declared realm due to high taxes and state interference in the free market 
which increases the cost, time and effort associated with formal employment (e.g., De Soto 
1989, 2001; London and Hart 2004; Nwabuzor 2005; Sauvy 1984). Viewed in this manner, 
salary under-reporting will be more prevalent in countries with higher taxes, greater state 
interference in the labour market and higher social transfers, and reductions in taxation and 
state interference the solution.  
7KLUG DQG ILQDOO\ D µstate under-intervention¶ WKHVLV conversely purports that the 
undeclared economy results from inadequate levels of state intervention in work and welfare, 
which leaves workers less than fully safeguarded and dependent on the undeclared economy 
as a survival strategy (Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013). Seen through this lens, salary under-
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reporting will result from inadequate levels of state intervention in the labour market and 
lower social transfers and the focus therefore should be upon increasing social transfers to 
reduce inequality and deprivation, and pursuing labour market interventions to help 
vulnerable groups (Davis 2006; Gallin 2001; ILO 2014). This illegal wage arrangement will 
be thus more prevalent in countries with higher levels of deprivation, less labour market 
intervention and less redistribution via social transfers. 
Until now, these competing explanations have only been evaluated using simple 
bivariate correlations between cross-national variations in envelope wages and cross-national 
variations in country-level variables (e.g., tax rates) that reflect the various tenets of these 
competing perspectives (Williams 2010, 2014b). These bivariate descriptive analyses reveal 
support for the modernisation and state under-intervention theses but no support for the state 
over-interference thesis. This simplistic analytical method however, fails to analyse whether 
these associations remain significant when holding other variables constant, including the 
individual-level variables above discussed. To evaluate this, we here use multi-level logistic 
regression analysis using the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within countries) to 
test the validity of the following explanations for this illegal labour practice: 
Modernisation hypotheses  
H2: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in more modernised economies  
H2a: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in wealthier economies. 
H2b: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in societies with modern state 
bureaucracies. 
 
State over-interference hypotheses  
H3: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with lower state-
interference. 
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H3a: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with lower tax 
rates. 
H3b: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with lower levels 
of expenditure on labour market interventions to protect vulnerable groups  
H3c: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with lower levels 
of redistribution via social transfers to protect workers from poverty. 
 
State under-intervention hypotheses  
H4: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with higher levels 
of state-intervention in work and welfare. 
H4a: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in countries with higher levels 
of severe material deprivation. 
H4b: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in more equal societies.  
H4c: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with greater levels 
of expenditure on labour market interventions to protect vulnerable groups. 
H4d: the likelihood of under-reporting wages is lower in economies with more 
effective policies of redistribution via social transfers to protect workers from poverty. 
 
Policy approaches towards salary under-reporting 
Conventionally, drawing upon the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) rational economic actor 
model, when the pay-off from evasion is greater than the expected cost of being caught and 
punished, the result is salary under-reporting. To tackle non-compliance, most governments 
have thus concentrated on the cost side of the equation by increasing for example the actual 
and/or perceived likelihood of detection using workplace inspections and data sharing and 
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matching to identify discrepancies in wage rates in particular businesses relative to the 
average in the sector (e.g., Hasseldine and Li 1999; Williams 2014a).  
However, no conclusive evidence exists that this approach is effective. Although some 
argue that increasing the probability of audit and detection reduces non-compliance, at least 
for some income groups (Klepper and Nagin 1989; Varma and Doob 1998), others reveal that 
it leads to increased non-compliance, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state 
and its citizens (Chang and Lai 2004; Kirchler et al. 2014). Indeed, the perhaps most telling 
rebuttal of the rational actor model is that many voluntarily comply even when the risks of 
detection compared with the benefits of being compliant warrant them acting in a non-
compliant manner (Murphy 2008).   
In recent years, therefore, D µVRFLDO DFWRU¶ model has emerged in the form of D µWD[
PRUDOH¶ DSSURDFK which views non-compliance as arising when the intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes is low. The consequent goal is to elicit greater voluntary commitment to compliant 
behaviour (Alm and Torgler 2011; Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2012). Rather than seek 
compliance via close supervision and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed procedures and 
centralised structures within the context of a low commitment, low trust and adversarial 
culture, a high trust, high commitment culture is pursued that aligns the values of employers 
and employees with the formal rules so as to generate internal control. This, therefore, seeks 
to change the norms, values and beliefs of citizens regarding compliance by improving tax 
knowledge, using awareness raising campaigns about the costs of non-compliance and 
benefits of compliance, and/or normative appeals.  
However, low tax morale is also symptomatic of the H[LVWHQFH RI µZHDN¶ IRUPDO
institutions. Changes in formal institutions are thus also sought. These are of two varieties. 
Firstly, changes in the processes of formal institutions are advocated through the promotion of 
tax fairness, procedural justice and redistributive justice (Murphy 2005) and secondly, wider 
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economic and social developments, akin to those in hypotheses 2-4 above, based on the belief 
that this illegal wage practice is a symptom of systemic problems related to the formal 
institutional environment. Here, therefore, we test the validity of the following hypotheses 
that, when combined with H2-4, reflect the contrasting ways of tackling this illegal wage 
practice:  
 
Detection hypothesis (H5a): salary under-reporting will be lower amongst those viewing 
the risk of detection as higher. 
 
Attitudes towards tax compliance hypothesis (H5b): salary under-reporting will be 
lower when there is higher tax morale.  
 
3. Methodology: data, variables and analytical methods 
Data 
We here report the results of special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which involved 27,563 
face-to-face interviews conducted in April and May 2013 across the EU-28. This interviewed 
adults aged 15 years and older in the national language based on a multi-stage random 
(probability) sampling methodology, with the number of interviews varying from 500 in 
smaller countries to 1,500 in larger nations. The methodology ensures that on the issues of 
gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as each level of sample is 
representative in proportion to its population size. Therefore, for the univariate analysis we 
employed sample weighting, as recommended in both the wider literature (Solon et al. 2013; 
Winship and Radbill 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful 
descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis however, debate exists over whether a 
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weighting scheme should be used (Pfefferman 1994; Solon et al. 2013; Winship and Radbill 
1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, we decided not to use the weighting scheme. 
 The face-to-face interviews covered attitudes towards undeclared work, followed by 
questions on purchasing undeclared goods and services, envelope wages and finally supplying 
undeclared work. Here, we confine discussion to the questions on envelope wages. This 
examined, firstly, whether formal employees had received an undeclared (envelope) wage in 
addition to their official declared wage from their employer in the prior 12 months, secondly, 
whether this envelope wage was for their regular work, as payment for overtime hours, or for 
both and, thirdly, the additional undeclared wage as a percentage of their gross annual wage.  
 
Variables  
To analyse the above hypotheses, the dependent variable is whether employees received 
under-reported wages based on the question µSometimes employers prefer to pay all or part of 
the salary or the remuneration (for extra work, overtime hours or the part above a legal 
minimum) in cash and without declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Has your 
employer paid you any of your income in the last 12 months in this way?¶. 
 To analyse the hypotheses regarding the prevalence and distribution of salary under-
reporting across employee groups and business types, the following individual-level variables 
are analysed to test H1a-f respectively: 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value one for men and zero for women. 
x Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the difficulties in paying bills with 
value one for having difficulties most of the time, value two for occasionally, and value 
three for almost never/ never. 
x Age: a numerical variable for the exact age of the respondent. 
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x Occupation: a categorical variable grouping employed respondents by their occupation 
with value one for those in an employed position at a desk, value two for employed 
professions, value three for general middle management, value four for those in an 
employed position, travelling, value five for those in an employed position in a service 
job, value six for supervisors, value seven for skilled manual workers and value eight for 
unskilled manaul workers, etc. 
x Age formal education ended: a categorical variable for age they stopped full time 
education with value one for 15 years old and under, value two for 16-19 years old, and 
value three for 20 years old or over. 
x Firm size D FDWHJRULFDO YDULDEOH IRU WKH QXPEHU RI SHRSOH WKDW UHVSRQGHQW¶V HPSOR\HU
employs with value one for firms with one to four people, value two for firms with five to 
nine people, value three for firms with ten to 19 people, value four for firms with 20 to 49 
people, value five for firms with 50 to 99 people, value six for firms with 100 to 499 
people and value seven for firms with 500 or more than 500 people. 
To analyse hypotheses H2-4, we evaluate the association between cross-national variations in 
salary under-reporting and the country-level variables considered important in each 
explanation. We use the same country-level variables as the previous simplistic bivariate 
analyses of the prevalence of the undeclared economy (Eurofound 2013; Vanderseypen et al. 
2013; Williams 2013) and salary under-reporting (Williams 2014b). To evaluate the 
modernisation hypotheses H2a and H2b respectively, the respective indicators used are: 
x GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (Eurostat 2014a), and  
x European Quality of Government Index ± this includes both perceptions and 
experiences with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens 
believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality. 
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The index is standardized with a mean of zero, with higher scores marking a higher 
quality of government (Charron et al. 2014). 
To evaluate the µVWDWHover-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶hypotheses (H3) meanwhile, the two indicators used 
to test the tax rate hypothesis (H3a) are: 
x Implicit tax rate (ITR) on labour, which approximates to the average effective tax 
EXUGHQRQODERXUDQGLV WKHVXPRIDOOGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFW WD[HVDQGHPSOR\HHV¶DQG
HPSOR\HUV¶VRFLDOFRQWULEXWLRns levied on employed labour income divided by the total 
compensation of employees (Eurostat 2014b); and 
x Current taxes on income, wealth, etc, which covers all compulsory, unrequited 
payments, in cash or in kind, levied periodically by general government and by the 
rest of the world on the income and wealth of institutional units, and some periodic 
taxes assessed neither on income nor wealth (Eurostat 2014c).  
To evaluate the state over-interference in the labour market hypothesis (H3b) and the opposite 
state under-intervention in the labour market hypothesis (H4c), meanwhile, we analyse:  
x Public expenditure on labour market interventions aimed at correcting disequilibria. 
This covers all public interventions in the labour market aimed at reaching its efficient 
functioning and correcting disequilibria (e.g., training, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, out-of-work income maintenance) which 
explicitly target groups with difficulties in the labour market, namely: the 
unemployed; those employed but at risk of involuntary job loss; and people who are 
currently inactive in the labour market but would like to work (Eurostat 2014f). 
To evaluate the state over-interference in poverty reduction hypothesis (H3c) and the state 
under-intervention in poverty reduction hypothesis (H4d), meanwhile, we analyse:  
x The impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, with poverty defined as the 
proportion of people with an income below 60 percent of the national median income. 
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This computed indicator is based on the formula, 100*(B-A)/B, where B=the 
proportion at-risk of poverty before social transfers excluding pensions (i.e., the share 
of people with an equivalised disposable income before social transfers below the at-
risk-of-poverty threshold), and A= the proportion at risk-of-poverty after social 
transfers (i.e., the share of people with an equivalised disposable income after social 
transfers below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold) (European Commission 2013). 
Finally, and to evaluate the two under-interventionist hypotheses that salary under-reporting is 
related to the level of inequality (H4a) and poverty (H4b), which result in vulnerable 
populations having to turn to such practices as a survival strategy, we analyse respectively the 
following two variables:   
x The level of income inequality, measured using the income quintile share ratio 
S80/S20, which is the ratio of total income received by the 20 per cent of the 
population with the highest income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20 per 
cent of the population with the lowest income (the bottom quintile) (Eurostat 2014e); 
x The level of severe material deprivation, measured by the percentage of the population 
unable to afford at least four items on a list of nine items considered by most people to 
be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life (Eurostat 2014d); 
Given the strong correlation between these eight country-level variables (see Table A1), we 
first computed an overall index for each of the three competing explanations of salary under-
reporting and secondly, for a deeper investigation, we treated each indicator in separate 
models, providing alternative perspectives on the reasons for salary under-reporting. To 
produce the overall index for each of the three explanations, we here used the min-max 
normalization method for constructing composite indicators (OECD 2008). This consists of 
assigning values between 0 (laggard) and 1 (leader) to each country-level variable and then 
aggregating them using equal weighting.  
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  Finally, to evaluate the hypotheses (H5a, H5b) regarding the ways of tackling salary 
under-reporting, the respective indicators analysed are: 
x perceived risk of detection, a categorical variable measuring the risk of being detected 
with recoded value one for very small, value two for fairly small, value three for fairly 
high and value four for very high; 
x attitudes towards non-compliance, measured using an interval variable based on 
HPSOR\HHV¶ rating the acceptability of six forms of non-compliance using a 10-point 
Likert scale (1 equals absolutely unacceptable and 10 equals absolutely acceptable). 
These are: someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; a firm is hired by 
another firm and does not report earnings; a firm hires a private person and all or part 
of their salary is not declared; a firm is hired by a household and does not report 
earnings; someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income; and a 
person hired by a household does not declare earnings when it should be declared. The 
index for each individual, group and nation is calculated using the mean score across 
these six attitudinal questions. Lower values represent higher tax morale, and vice 
versa. 
 
Analytical methods 
To evaluate the prevalence and distribution of salary under-reporting across employee groups 
and business types (hypotheses H1), we conduct a logistic regression analysis across the 
individual-level variables. The hypotheses (H2-4) investigating the country-level variables 
associated with a higher propensity to under-report salaries are tested by staged multi-level 
logistic regression analysis. This utilizes the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within 
countries) by firstly examining the individual-level variables and then integrating each 
country-level independent variable in turn to analyse their association with a higher 
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propensity to under-report salaries. To evaluate the validity of using various policy measures 
to tackle salary under-reporting (hypotheses H5) similarly, we investigate attitudes towards 
these policy measures to analyse whether they are significantly associated with a lower 
propensity to receive under-reported salaries, whilst holding constant the other variables. 
Below, we report the results. 
 
4. Descriptive findings 
Of the 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted during 2013 across the EU-28, some 11,025 
respondents (42 per cent) were formal employees. Of these, one in 33 (3 per cent) had 
received part of their salary from their employer as an undeclared µenvelope¶ wage in the 
year prior to the survey. Extrapolating from this, 6.36 million of the 212 million employees in 
the EU-28 receive under-reported salaries and on average, 25 per cent of their gross annual 
income in this manner.  
 
Variations across businesses and employee groups 
As Table 1 displays, the distribution of salary under-reporting is uneven across business types 
and employee groups. Although this illegal labour practice prevails in all sizes of firm, 
occupations and socio-demographic groups, it is more common in some. Smaller firms are 
more likely to fraudulently under-report salaries, with 5 per cent of formal employees in 
businesses with less than 20 employees receiving envelope wages compared with 1 per cent 
of employees in businesses employing 50 employees or over. This in part may be a result of 
the relative absence of dedicated HRM staff and formal HRM practices in smaller businesses 
(Barrett and Mayson 2007; Benmore and Palmer 1996), meaning that employers are more 
able to introduce unwritten verbal contracts that contravene the HPSOR\HHV¶ formal written 
contract. 
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 Salary under-reporting is also more prevalent amongst some employee groups. 
Manual workers are more likely to receive envelope wages; 7 per cent of unskilled and 5 per 
cent of skilled manual workers. So too are younger people, amongst whom joblessness is 
much higher (European Commission 2013), although those of retirement age are also more 
likely, as are those with less years in formal education and those having difficulties paying the 
household bills most of the time. Therefore, the tentative picture is that salary under-reporting 
is more prevalent amongst vulnerable employees. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Cross-national variations in the under-reporting of wages  
It is similarly the case that the prevalence of wage under-reporting is uneven across nations 
and EU regions. As Table 2 displays, in East-Central Europe 6 per cent of formal employees 
receive envelope wages, compared with 4 per cent in Southern Europe and just 1 per cent in 
Western Europe and Nordic countries. Given that East-Central Europe is the abode of just 22 
per cent of the formal employees surveyed, but 45 per cent of those receiving envelope wages, 
this wage practice is therefore heavily concentrated in East-Central European nations.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
It is not equally prevalent however, across all East-Central European nations. In Latvia, 11 
per cent of formal employees receive envelope wages, 7 per cent in Romania, 5 per cent in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland respectively and 4 per cent in Slovenia. Other nations 
beyond East-Central Europe having above EU-average rates include Greece (7 per cent), 
Spain (5 per cent) and Belgium (4 per cent). 
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5. Analysis 
To evaluate firstly, whether the variations across business types and employee groups are 
significant when other characteristics are taken into account and held constant (H1), secondly, 
the validity of the contrasting explanations for the cross-national variations in salary under-
reporting (H2-4), and thirdly, the policy approaches (H5), we here report the results of a 
staged multi-level logistic regression model. This utilizes the hierarchical nature of the data 
(individuals within countries).     
 The first stage in the analysis estimated a baseline random intercept model with no 
explanatory variables to identify the appropriateness of a multi-level approach. This analysis 
indicated that over 13 per cent of the variance in salary under-reporting is accounted for at the 
country level (Wald = 8.469, df=1, p<0.01), indicating significant variation between countries 
in the prevalence of envelope wage payments. Given this justification for using multilevel 
mixed-effects logistic regression analysis, the second stage involved constructing a model 
with first-level (i.e. individual-level) variables to understand their effect. The third stage then 
included both first- and second-level (i.e. country-level) variables to understand the effects at 
both levels.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
 
Model 1 in Table 3 reports which business types and employee groups are more likely to 
receive under-reported salaries when taking into account and holding constant other 
characteristics. This reveals the uneven distribution of salary under-reporting. Smaller firms 
are significantly more likely to under-report wages (confirming H1f) and unskilled and skilled 
manual workers, and those who travel for their jobs more likely to receive envelope wages 
than those in employed positions at a desk (confirming H1d). This displays that employers 
19 
 
target vulnerable groups. Compared with an employed position at a desk, being an unskilled 
and skilled manual worker increases the log odds of receiving envelope wages by 0.556 and 
0.674 respectively. Compared with an employed position at a desk, travelling for a job 
increases the log odds of receiving envelope wages by 0.805, doubtless due to working longer 
hours than their formal written contract stipulates. Men are also significantly more likely to 
receive under-reported salaries than women (refuting H1a), as are younger employees 
(confirming H1c), those who have difficulties most of the time in paying their household bills 
(confirming H1b) and those with fewer years in education (confirming H1c). Receiving 
under-reported salaries is thus more likely among vulnerable population groups, perhaps 
reflecting how employers target such groups.   
Models 2-4 in Table 3 meanwhile, test hypotheses H2-4 regarding how to explain the 
cross-national variations in salary under-reporting. Firstly, however, we must determine 
whether significant cross-national variations exist in the propensity to under-report salaries 
after controlling for the individual-level variables. Figure 1 displays the residual country 
effects. A country whose confidence interval does not overlap the line at zero differs 
significantly from the EU-28 average at the 5 per cent significance level. At the lower end, 
Germany and Italy have a significantly lower propensity to under-report salaries. At the upper 
end, Romania, Latvia, Croatia and Bulgaria have a significantly higher propensity to under-
report salaries. Given these significant cross-national variations in the propensity to under-
report salaries when the individual-level variables are included, we can here evaluate the 
various competing explanations.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
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Eight country-level variables evaluate the various tenets of the three competing explanations 
for the cross-national variations in salary under-reporting. Given that these eight country-level 
variables are strongly correlated (see Table A1), we first compute an overall index for each of 
the three competing explanations of salary under-reporting and secondly, for a deeper 
investigation, treat each indicator in separate models, providing alternative perspectives on 
the reasons for salary under-reporting.  
Starting with the modernisation thesis, model 2 reveals a significant relationship 
between salary under-reporting and the modernisation index (confirming H2). Breaking this 
down, model 2a in Table 3 provides evidence that an employee in countries with lower levels 
of GDP per capita is more likely to engage in salary under-reporting (confirming H2a). For a 
one unit increase in GDP per capita, the log odds of receiving envelope wages decreases by 
0.014. Model 2b reveals that salary under-reporting is higher among employees living in 
countries with lower qualities of government (confirming H2b). For a unit increase in the 
European Quality of Governance Index, the log odds of receiving envelope wages decreases 
by 0.350. These models therefore support the modernisation thesis (H2) that in countries with 
lower levels of economic development and less modernised state bureaucracies, salary under-
reporting is more prevalent. 
To evaluate the state over-interference thesis (H3), model 3 reveals no significant 
relationship between salary under-reporting and the state over-interference index (refuting 
H3). Breaking this down, model 3a shows that the implicit tax rate on labour has no 
significant association with salary under-reporting (refuting H3a), whilst model 3b reveals a 
significant association between salary under-reporting and current taxes but in the opposite 
direction proposed by H3a. Salary under-reporting is more common among employees living 
in countries with lower tax levels (again refuting H3a).  
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Evaluating the state under-intervention hypothesis (H4), model 4 displays a significant 
association between salary under-reporting and the state under-intervention index (confirming 
H4). Breaking this down, Model 4a reveals salary under-reporting to be more likely among 
employees in countries with higher rates of severe material deprivation (confirming H4a) and 
model 4b that salary under-reporting is more likely among employees in countries with higher 
income inequalities (confirming H4b). Evaluating whether various forms of state intervention 
reduce salary under-reporting, model 4c displays that salary under-reporting is more likely 
among employees in countries with smaller levels of public expenditure on labour market 
interventions to protect vulnerable groups in the labour market (confirming H4c and refuting 
H3c). Meanwhile, model 4d displays that salary under-reporting is more likely among 
employees in countries where social transfers are of a level that they reduce poverty 
(confirming H4d and refuting H3s). Importantly moreover, the inclusion of all these country-
level variables reduces country-level variance. Yet, there remains an amount of unexplained 
between-countries variance in salary under-reporting.  
Turning to hypotheses H5 regarding how to tackle salary under-reporting, all the 
models in Table 3 reveal no association between the perceived risk of detection and salary 
under-reporting when other variables are held constant (refuting H5a). Increasing the risk of 
detection seems not to influence participation. However, across all models, a significant 
association exists between salary under-reporting and attitudes towards compliance, 
whichever other characteristics are taken into account and held constant (confirming H5b). A 
unit decrease in tax morale increases the log odds of receiving envelope wages by 0.286. This 
suggests that changing attitudes towards compliance influences the level of salary under-
reporting.  
       
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
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In 2013 in the EU-28, 1 in 33 formal employees surveyed report receiving an undeclared 
µHQYHORSH¶ZDJHfrom their employer in the prior 12 months amounting on average to 25 per 
cent of their gross income. Although ubiquitous across all business types, employee groups 
and countries, salary under-reporting is more prevalent in small businesses and vulnerable 
population groups, including unskilled and skilled manual workers, younger age groups, those 
who have difficulties paying their household bills and with fewer years in education. It is also 
concentrated in countries with lower levels of economic development and less modernised 
state bureaucracies, greater income inequality, higher rates of severe material deprivation, less 
effective redistribution via social transfers and lower levels of labour market interventions to 
protect vulnerable groups in the labour market.  
Conventionally, tackling this illegal labour practice has involved viewing participants 
as rational economic actors, and increasing the actual and perceived risks of detection. The 
above analysis, however, reveals that perceiving the risk of detection as higher does not 
influence whether one accepts an under-reported salary. Salary under-reporting is nevertheless 
significantly associated with attitudes towards non-compliance. Those with higher tax morale 
are less likely to collude with employers than those with lower tax morale. To reduce salary 
under-reporting therefore, the conventional approach of improving detection appears not to be 
effective. Instead, measures are required to alter attitudes towards compliance.  
Three policy measures can improve attitudes towards compliance. Firstly, to educate 
employers and employees about the value of taxation so as to elicit an intrinsic motivation to 
comply, information can be provided on the public goods and services paid for by their taxes 
(Saeed and Shah 2011). Secondly, it requires advertising campaigns about the benefits of full 
salary declaration. These can either inform: employees of the costs and risks of under-
reporting salaries; employers of the risks and costs; employees of the benefits of fully 
declaring salaries, and/or employers of the benefits of fully declaring labour. Third and 
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finally, it requires normative appeals to employers and employees, which for example in 
Estonia during 2008 resulted in 46 per cent of enterprises adjusting their wage levels and 
paying more taxes (Lill and Nurmela 2009). 
Addressing attitudes towards non-compliance, however, is necessary but insufficient 
to reduce salary under-reporting. As the country-level variables display, the formal 
institutional environment also requires reform. On the one hand, and as model 2 in Table 3 
reveals, this necessitates improvements in the quality of government, including procedural 
justice, which refers to whether employers and employees believe that the tax authority treat 
then in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Murphy 2005), procedural fairness, 
which is the extent to which employers and employees believe they are paying their fair share 
compared with others (Molero and Pujol 2012; Wenzel 2006), and redistributive justice, 
which refers to whether employers and employees believe they receive the goods and services 
they deserve given the taxes that they pay (Kirchgässner 2010). On the other hand, and as 
models 3-4 in Table 3 more widely display, governments also need to pursue the achievement 
of lower levels of severe material deprivation, higher income equality, greater redistribution 
via social transfers, and higher state intervention in the labour market to protect vulnerable 
groups.  
 The theoretical implication, therefore, is not only that the modernisation and state 
under-intervention theses need synthesising when explaining this illegal labour practice, but 
also perhaps that the validity of explaining fraudulent salary under-reporting through an 
institutional theoretical lens requires exploration (Baumol and Blinder 2008; North 1990). 
Conventionally, this institutional approach is associated with rational choice theory. Here, 
however, we argue that institutional theory can also support a social actor explanation. 
Institutional theory views all societies as having codified laws and regulations (i.e., formal 
institutions) that define the legal rules of the game and informal institutions that are socially 
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shared unwritten rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). This, we contend, can provide a useful 
theoretical lens for explaining salary under-reporting from a social actor perspective as arising 
when the informal institutions are unaligned with the formal institutions. Viewed through this 
institutionalist lens, tax morale measures the degree of asymmetry between individual 
attitudes towards tax compliance µFLYLFPRUDOLW\¶DQGthe formal rules µVWDWH PRUDOLW\¶7KH
greater the asymmetry between civic and state morality, the greater will be the prevalence of 
salary under-reporting. Future research could therefore more fully evaluate such an 
institutionalist asymmetry explanation of salary under-reporting and more widely explore how 
institutional theory can provide a heuristic framework for supporting a social actor 
perspective, rather than viewing it solely as supporting a rational choice approach.  
There are also other limitations of this study and caveats required. Currently, there 
remains poor understanding of firstly, the extra conditions imposed on employees in these 
informal unwritten contracts, secondly, the power relations involved in these agreements to 
pay under-reported salaries (e.g., whether they are always employer-instigated and imposed 
on employees), and thirdly, their effects on the quality and security of employment. Future 
qualitative research on these issues will result in a fuller understanding of salary under-
reporting.    
If this paper stimulates scholars to conduct further quantitative and qualitative studies 
of both this and other illegal labour practices (e.g., undeclared employment, bogus self-
employment), and perhaps explore further the use of institutional theory to support a social 
actor rather than rational actor explanation of such practices, then it will have fulfilled one of 
its major intentions. If this then results in greater consideration of how to tackle these illegal 
labour practices, and governments recognising that illegal labour practices are a symptom of 
systemic problems, which simply detecting and punishing the individuals engaged in such 
practices cannot resolve, the paper will have fulfilled its wider intention.   
25 
 
References 
$OOLQJKDP0DQG6DQGPR$µ,QFRPHWD[HYDVLRQDWKHRUHWLFDODQDO\VLV¶Journal 
of Public Economics, 1: 323-38. 
Alm, J. and Torgler, B. (2011). µ'RHWKLFVPDWWHU"WD[FRPSOLDQFHDQGPRUDOLW\¶. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 101: 635±51. 
Andrews, D., Caldera Sanchez, A. and Johansson, A. (2011). Towards a Better Understanding of 
the Informal Economy. Paris: OECD Economics Department Working Paper no. 873, 
OECD. 
%DUUHWW 5 DQG 0D\VRQ 6  µ+XPDQ UHVRXUFH PDQDJHPHQW LQ JURZLQJ VPDOO
ILUPV¶ Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 14: 307-320. 
Baumol, W.J. and Blinder, A. (2008). Macroeconomics: principles and policy. Cincinnati, OH: 
South-Western Publishing. 
Benmore, G, and Palmer, A. µ+XPDQUHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQWLQVPDOOILUPVNHHSLQJLW
VWULFWO\LQIRUPDO¶Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 3: 109-18. 
Chang, J.J., and Lai, C.C. (2004). µCollaborative tax evasion and social norms: why 
deterrence does not work¶. Oxford Economic Papers, 56: 344-368. 
&KDUURQ1'LMNVWUD/DQG/DSXHQWH9µ0DSSLQJWKHUHJLRQDOGLYLGHLQ(XURSHD
PHDVXUH IRU DVVHVVLQJ TXDOLW\ RI JRYHUQPHQW LQ  (XURSHDQ UHJLRQV¶ Social 
Indicators Research. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-014-0702-y. 
&KDYGDURYD 7  µ(QYHORSH ZDJHV¶ 3DSHU SUHVHQWHG DW WKH States and States of 
Informality Conference, Sofia, 5 September. 
Davis, M. (2006). Planet of slums. London: Verso.  
De Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path. London: Harper and Row. 
De Soto, H. (2001) The Mystery of Capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else. London: Black Swan. 
26 
 
Eurofound (2013). Tackling Undeclared Work in 27 European Union Member States and 
Norway: approaches and measures since 2008. Dublin: Eurofound. 
European Commission (2013). Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2013. 
Brussels: European Commission.  
Eurostat (2014a). GDP per capita in PPS. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=
en&pcode=tec00114 
Eurostat (2014b). Implicit tax rate on labour, Available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode
=tec00119&plugin=0 
Eurostat (2014c). Current taxes on income, wealth etc, Available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode
=tec00018&plugin=0 
Eurostat (2014d). Severe material deprivation, Available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=
en&pcode=tsdsc270 
Eurostat (2014e). Income inequalities. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode
=tessi180&plugin=1 
Eurostat (2014f). Labour market policy interventions, 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Labour_market_polic
y_interventions> (accessed February 14 2014) 
*DOOLQ '  µ3URSRVLWLRQV RQ WUDGH XQLRQV DQG LQIRUPDO HPSOR\PHQW LQ WLPH RI
JOREDOLVDWLRQ¶Antipode, 19: 531-49. 
27 
 
+DVVHOGLQH-DQG/L=µ0RUHWD[HYDVLRQUHVHDUFKUHTXLUHGLQQHZPLOOHQQLXP¶Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 31: 91-104. 
+HOPNH * DQG /HYLWVN\ 6  µ,QIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG FRPSDUDWLYH SROLWLFV D
UHVHDUFKDJHQGD¶Perspectives on Politics, 2: 725-40. 
ILO (2014). Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy. Geneva: ILO. 
Kapelyushnikov, R., Kuznetsov, A. and Kuznetisova, O. (2010) µThe role of the informal 
sector, flexible working time and pay in the Russian labour market mode¶ Post-
Communist Economies, 24: 177-190. 
Kirchgässner, G. (2010). Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the Shadow Economy. St Gallen: 
Discussion Paper no. 2010-17, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, St. 
Gallen, Switzerland. 
Kirchler, E. (2007). The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kirchler, E., Kogler, C. and Muehlbacher, S. (2014). µ&RRSHUDWLYH WD[ FRPSOLDQFH IURP
GHWHUUHQFHWRGHIHUHQFH¶. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23: 87-92. 
Klepper, S. and Nagin, D. (1989). µ7D[FRPSOLDQFHDQGSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHULVNVRIGHWHFWLRQ
DQGFULPLQDOSURVHFXWLRQ¶. Law and Society Review, 23: 209-40.  
Kukk, M. and Staehr, K. (2014). µIncome underreporting by households with business 
income: evidence from Estonia¶. Post-Communist Economies, 26: 257-226. 
La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. (2014). µ,QIRUPDOLW\ DQG GHYHORSPHQW¶. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28: 109-126. 
Lewis, A. (1959). The Theory of Economic Growth. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Lill, L. and Nurmela, K. (2009). Notification letters from Tax and Customs Board, Estonia, 
available at https://eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/cases/ee001.htm 
28 
 
/RQGRQ7DQG+DUW6/µ5HLQYHQWLQJVWUDWHJLHVIRUHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVEH\RQGWKH
WUDQVQDWLRQDOPRGHO¶Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 350-70. 
Meriküll, J. and 6WDHKU .  µ8QUHSRUWHG HPSOR\PHQW DQG HQYHORSH ZDJHV LQ PLG-
WUDQVLWLRQFRPSDULQJGHYHORSPHQWVDQGFDXVHVLQWKH%DOWLFFRXQWULHV¶Comparative 
Economic Studies, 52: 637-670. 
0ROHUR-&DQG3XMRO)µ:DONLQJLQVLGHWKHSRWHQWLDOWD[HYDGHU¶VPLQGWD[PRUDOH
GRHVPDWWHU¶Journal of Business Ethics, 105: 151-162. 
0XUSK\.µ5HJXODWLQJPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSURFHGXUDOMXVWLFH
legitimacy and tax non-FRPSOLDQFH¶Journal of Law and Society, 32: 562-89. 
Murphy, K. (2008). µ(QIRUFLQJWD[FRPSOLDQFH WRSXQLVKRUSHUVXDGH"¶. Economic Analysis 
and Policy, 38: 113-35. 
1HHI 5  µ$VSHFWV RI WKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ LQ D WUDQVIRUPLQJ FRXQWU\ WKH FDVH RI
5RPDQLD¶International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 26: 299-322. 
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
1ZDEX]RU $  µ&RUUXSWLRQ DQG GHYHORSPHQW QHZ LQLWLDWLYHV LQ HFRQRPLF RSHQQHVV
DQGVWUHQJWKHQHGUXOHRIODZ¶Journal of Business Ethics, 59: 121-38. 
OECD (2008). Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: methodology and user guide. 
Paris: OECD Publications. 
OECD (2003). Labour Market and Social Policies in the Baltic Countries. Paris: OECD. 
3IHIIHUPDQQ '  µ7KH UROH RI VDPSOLQJ ZHLJKWV ZKHQ PRGHOOLQJ VXUYH\ GDWD¶
International Statistical Review 61: 317-37. 
Putni৆ã 7 DQG 6DXND, A. (2015). µ0HDVXULQJ WKH VKDGRZ HFRQRP\ XVLQJ FRPSDQ\
PDQDJHUV¶. Journal of Comparative Economics, 43: 471-490.  
29 
 
Round, J., Williams, C.C. and Rodgers, P. (2008). µ&RUUXSWLRQLQWKHSRVW-Soviet workplace: 
WKHH[SHULHQFHVRIUHFHQWJUDGXDWHVLQFRQWHPSRUDU\8NUDLQH¶. Work, Employment and 
Society, 22: 149-166.  
Rousseau, D.M. (1995). Psychological contracts in organizations: understanding written and 
unwritten agreements. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
6DHHG$DQG6KDK$µ(QKDQFLQJWD[PRUDOHZLWKPDUNHWLQJWDFWLFVDUHYLHZRIWKH
OLWHUDWXUH¶African Journal of Business Management, 5: 13659-65. 
6DVXQNHYLFK2³%XVLQHVVDVFDVXDOVKXWWOHWUDGHRQWKH%HODUXV-/LWKXDQLDERUGHU´
in Morris, J. and Polese, A. (Eds.), The Informal Post-Socialist Economy: embedded 
practices and livelihoods, Routledge, London, pp. 135-51.   
Sauvy, A. (1984). Le 7UDYDLO1RLUHWO¶(FRQRPLHGH'HPDLQ. Paris: Calmann-Levy. 
6HGOHQLHNV.  µ&DVK LQ DQ HQYHORSH FRUUXSWLRQDQG WD[ DYRLGDQFHDV DQ HFRQRPLF
VWUDWHJ\ LQ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 5LJD¶ ,Q .-O. Arnstberg and T. Boren (eds). Everyday 
Economy in Russia, Poland and Latvia. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 42-62.  
6ODYQLF=µ3ROLWLFDOHFRQRP\RILQIRUPDOL]DWLRQ¶European Societies, 12: 3-23. 
Solon G., Haider, S.J. and Wooldridge, J. (2013). What are we weighting for? Cambridge: 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 18859. 
7DLZR 2  µ(PSOR\PHQW FKRLFH DQG PRELOLW\ LQ PXOWL-sector labour markets: 
WKHRUHWLFDOPRGHODQGHYLGHQFHIURP*KDQD¶International Labour Review, 152: 469-
92. 
Torgler, B. (2012). µ7D[PRUDOH(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQG(XURSHDQHQODUJHPHQW¶. Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 45: 11-25. 
TUC (2008). Hard Work, Hidden Lives: the short report of the Commission on Vulnerable 
Employment. London: TUC 
30 
 
Vanderseypen, G., Tchipeva, T., Peschner, J., Rennoy, P. and Williams, C.C. (2013). 
µ8QGHFODUHGZRUNUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWV¶LQ(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQHGEmployment 
and Social Developments in Europe 2013. Brussels: European Commission, 231-74.  
Varma, K. and Doob, A. (1998). µ'HWHUULQJ HFRQRPLF FULPHV WKH FDVH RI WD[ HYDVLRQ¶. 
Canadian Journal of Criminology, 40: 165-84.  
:HQ]HO 0  µ$ OHWWHU IURP WKH WD[ RIILFH FRPSOLDQFH HIIHFWV RI LQIRUPDWLRQDO DQG
LQWHUSHUVRQDOIDLUQHVV¶Social Fairness Research, 19: 345-64.  
Williams, C.C. (2007). µ7DFNOLQJ XQGHFODUHG ZRUN LQ (XURSH OHVVRQV IURP D VWXG\ RI
8NUDLQH¶. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13: 219±237.  
:LOOLDPV&&µ%H\RQGWKHIRUPDOLQIRUPDOHPSOR\PHQWGXDOLVPWKHSUHYDOHQFHDQG
JHRJUDSKLHVRI³TXDVL-IRUPDO´HPSOR\PHQWLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 16: 147-59. 
:LOOLDPV &&  µEvaluating cross-national variations in the extent and nature of 
LQIRUPDOHPSOR\PHQWLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Industrial Relations Journal, 44: 479-
94. 
Williams, C.C. (2014a). Confronting the Shadow Economy: evaluating tax compliance 
behaviour and policies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
:LOOLDPV&& E µExplaining cross-national variations in the prevalence of envelope 
wages: some lessons from a 2013 EurobDURPHWHU VXUYH\¶ Industrial Relations 
Journal, 45: 524-542. 
:LOOLDPV && DQG 3DGPRUH -  µ(QYHORSH ZDJHV LQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶
International Labour Review, 152: 411-30.  
Williams, C.C. and Round, J. (2007). µBeyond negative depictions of informal employment: 
some lessons from Moscow¶ Urban Studies, 44: 2321-2338. 
31 
 
:LOOLDPVRQ2µ7KHOHQVRIFRQWUDFWSULYDWHRUGHULQJ¶American Economic Review, 
92: 438-43.  
:LQVKLS&DQG5DGELOO/µ6DPSOLQJZHLJKWVDQGUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLV¶Sociological 
Methods and Research, 23: 230-57. 
:RROIVRQ &  µ3XVKLQJ WKH HQYHORSH WKH ³LQIRUPDOLVDWLRQ´ RI ODERXU LQ SRVW-
FRPPXQLVWQHZ(8PHPEHUVWDWHV¶Work, Employment & Society, 21: 551-64. 
 
  
32 
 
Table 1. Prevalence of salary under-reporting in the EU-28, by type of business and employee 
group 
 
 % employees 
receiving  
under-reported 
salaries in 
prior year 
% of gross 
salary 
received as 
envelope 
wage 
(median) 
% of all 
under-
reported 
salary 
employees 
% of all 
employees 
All EU28 3 25 100 100 
Firm size:     
1 - 4 employees 5 30 19 10 
5 ± 9 5 23 20 11 
10 ± 19 5 23 24 13 
20 ± 49 3 20 16 15 
50 ± 99 1 35 5 11 
100 ± 499 1 25 8 16 
500 or more 1 28 8 24 
Occupation:     
Professional (doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect) 3 20 6 6 
Top, middle management, supervisor 1 30 8 21 
Employed mainly at desk 1 20 8 20 
Employed travelling (salesperson, driver) 4 20 9 7 
Service job not at desk (hospital, restaurant, police, 
etc.) 2 20 14 17 
Skilled manual worker 5 30 35 22 
Unskilled manual worker 7 50 17 7 
Gender:     
Man 3 25 63 53 
Woman 2 30 37 47 
Age:     
15-24 6 25 17 9 
25-34 3 25 27 23 
35-44 3 20 28 28 
45-54 2 30 21 27 
55-64 1 15 6 12 
65+ 3 25 1 1 
Age formal education ended:    
<15 3 28 10 9 
16-19 3 30 63 50 
20+ 2 20 27 41 
Difficulties paying bills:     
Most of the time 6 30 20 10 
From time to time 4 30 39 29 
Almost never/never 2 20 41 61 
Detection risk:     
Very small 4 40 22 16 
Fairly small 2 25 36 45 
Fairly high 3 20 31 32 
Very high 4 15 11 7 
Tax morality (mean =  2.33):     
Below mean 2 30 36 59 
Above mean 4 25 64 41 
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Table 2. Cross-national variations in the prevalence of salary under-reporting, by EU member 
state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Region/ country Number of formal 
employees surveyed 
% of formal employees 
receiving under-reported 
salaries 
% of gross income 
received as envelope 
wage (median) 
EU-28 11,025 3 25 
East-Central Europe 4,670 6 30 
Latvia 509 11 50 
Croatia 328 8 35 
Romania 391 7 9 
Slovakia 497 7 20 
Bulgaria 442 6 30 
Hungary 442 6 20 
Lithuania 414 6 20 
Czech Republic 502 5 25 
Estonia 434 5 40 
Poland 381 5 20 
Slovenia 330 4 20 
Southern Europe 1,626 4 50 
Greece 260 7 10 
Spain 279 5 100 
Portugal 312 3 100 
Cyprus 211 2 50 
Italy 417 2 65 
Malta 147 0 -- 
Western Europe 3,548 1 10 
Belgium 406 4 5 
Luxembourg 247 3 11 
Netherlands 384 3 5 
Austria 520 2 10 
Ireland 394 2 8 
United Kingdom 497 2 20 
France 429 1 6 
Germany 671 1 30 
Nordic nations 1,181 1 3 
Denmark 423 2 1 
Finland 342 1 4 
Sweden 416 1 5 
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Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to receive under-reported salaries 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b 
Fixed part E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) 
Constant -3.062 0.405 *** 0.047 -2.519 0.424 *** 0.081 -3.285 0.400 *** 0.037 -3.213 0.402 *** 0.040 
Gender (Women)                 
Men 0.401 0.128 *** 1.493 0.404 0.127 *** 1.498 0.406 0.127 *** 1.501 0.402 0.127 *** 1.495 
Age (Centred age: 41) -0.020 0.005 *** 0.980 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 
Formal education (15 and under)                 
16-19 0.545 0.283 * 1.725 0.544 0.281 * 1.723 0.545 0.281 * 1.725 0.544 0.281 * 1.723 
20+ 0.182 0.309  1.200 0.221 0.307  1.247 0.223 0.307  1.250 0.214 0.307  1.239 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)                
From time to time -0.555 0.161 *** 0.574 -0.525 0.160 *** 0.591 -0.524 0.160 *** 0.592 -0.531 0.160 *** 0.588 
Almost never/never -1.150 0.176 *** 0.317 -1.054 0.178 *** 0.349 -1.055 0.177 ***  0.348 -1.068 0.178 *** 0.344 
Occupation (Employed position, at desk)                 
Employed professional 0.496 0.302  1.642 0.485 0.301  1.624 0.472 0.301  1.603 0.494 0.301  1.638 
General, middle management, supervisor etc. 0.190 0.253  1.209 0.227 0.253  1.255 0.219 0.253  1.245 0.226 0.253  1.253 
Employed position, travelling 0.805 0.247 *** 2.237 0.817 0.246 *** 2.264 0.808 0.246 ***  2.243 0.821 0.247 *** 2.272 
Employed position, service job 0.313 0.233  1.368 0.355 0.234  1.426 0.347 0.233  1.414 0.354 0.234  1.425 
Skilled manual worker 0.674 0.213 *** 1.961 0.696 0.213 *** 2.005 0.685 0.213 ***  1.983 0.699 0.213 *** 2.012 
Unskilled manual worker, etc. 0.556 0.282 ** 1.744 0.615 0.283 ** 1.850 0.608 0.282 ** 1.836 0.610 0.283 ** 1.841 
Company size (1-4 employees)                 
5 ± 9 -0.185 0.206  0.831 -0.180 0.205  0.835 -0.181 0.205  0.835 -0.180 0.205  0.835 
10 ± 19 -0.253 0.196  0.776 -0.247 0.194  0.781 -0.248 0.194  0.780 -0.247 0.195  0.781 
20 ± 49 -0.546 0.204 *** 0.579 -0.538 0.202 *** 0.584 -0.538 0.202 *** 0.584 -0.539 0.203 *** 0.583 
50 ± 99 -1.034 0.250 *** 0.356 -1.019 0.249 *** 0.361 -1.019 0.249 *** 0.361 -1.021 0.249 *** 0.360 
100 ± 499 -1.117 0.242 *** 0.327 -1.076 0.242 *** 0.341 -1.076 0.241 *** 0.341 -1.083 0.242 *** 0.339 
500 or more -1.420 0.272 *** 0.242 -1.341 0.273 *** 0.261 -1.341 0.272 *** 0.262 -1.354 0.273 *** 0.258 
Detection risk (Very small)                 
Fairly small -0.173 0.163  0.841 -0.155 0.162  0.856 -0.157 0.162  0.855 -0.157 0.162  0.855 
Fairly high -0.177 0.175  0.838 -0.169 0.174  0.845 -0.169 0.173  0.845 -0.170 0.174  0.844 
Very high 0.100 0.242  1.105 0.091 0.241  1.095 0.095 0.241  1.100 0.090 0.241  1.094 
Tax morality (Centred) 0.286 0.031 *** 1.331 0.285 0.030 *** 1.330 0.286 0.030 *** 1.331 0.285 0.031 *** 1.329 
Modernisation Index     -1.371 0.365 *** 0.254         
GDP per capita in PPS 2013 (Centred)         -0.014 0.004 *** 0.986     
European Quality of Government Index 2013 (Centred)            -0.350 0.108 *** 0.705 
N    8741    8741    8741    8741 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.2512*** 0.1014*** 0.0846** 0.1321*** 
(Standard error) 0.1033 0.0656 0.0626 0.0719 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 7.09 2.99 2.51 3.86 
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Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to receive under-reported salaries ± continued 
 Model 3 Model 3a Model 3b Model 4 
Fixed part E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) 
Constant -2.121 0.825 ** 0.120 -3.116 0.404 *** 0.044 -3.115 0.403 *** 0.044 -2.475 0.452 *** 0.084 
Gender (Women)                 
Men 0.398 0.128 *** 1.489 0.398 0.128 *** 1.489 0.403 0.128 *** 1.497 0.399 0.127 *** 1.490 
Age (Centred age: 41) -0.020 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.020 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 
Formal education (15 and under)                 
16-19 0.557 0.284 ** 1.746 0.558 0.283 ** 1.747 0.539 0.282 * 1.715 0.554 0.282 ** 1.740 
20+ 0.197 0.309  1.218 0.199 0.309  1.220 0.210 0.308  1.234 0.204 0.307  1.226 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)                
From time to time -0.551 0.161 *** 0.576 -0.551 0.161 *** 0.576 -0.548 0.161 *** 0.578 -0.528 0.161 *** 0.590 
Almost never/never -1.137 0.176 *** 0.321 -1.135 0.176 *** 0.321 -1.111 0.176 *** 0.329 -1.079 0.178 *** 0.340 
Occupation (Employed position, at desk)                 
Employed professional 0.479 0.302  1.614 0.477 0.302  1.612 0.490 0.302  1.632 0.468 0.301  1.596 
General, middle management, supervisor etc. 0.178 0.253  1.195 0.178 0.253  1.195 0.207 0.253  1.230 0.196 0.253  1.217 
Employed position, travelling 0.804 0.247 *** 2.234 0.804 0.247 *** 2.234 0.814 0.247 *** 2.257 0.801 0.247 *** 2.228 
Employed position, service job 0.308 0.233  1.360 0.308 0.233  1.361 0.337 0.234  1.401 0.323 0.233  1.381 
Skilled manual worker 0.670 0.213 *** 1.954 0.670 0.213 *** 1.954 0.691 0.214 *** 1.997 0.678 0.213 *** 1.970 
Unskilled manual worker, etc. 0.549 0.282 * 1.731 0.549 0.282 * 1.731 0.589 0.283 ** 1.803 0.575 0.282 ** 1.777 
Company size (1-4 employees)                 
5 ± 9 -0.179 0.206  0.836 -0.178 0.206  0.837 -0.183 0.206  0.833 -0.183 0.205  0.833 
10 ± 19 -0.248 0.196  0.780 -0.248 0.195  0.780 -0.254 0.195  0.776 -0.252 0.195  0.777 
20 ± 49 -0.537 0.204 *** 0.584 -0.537 0.204 *** 0.585 -0.545 0.203 *** 0.580 -0.535 0.203 *** 0.585 
50 ± 99 -1.029 0.250 *** 0.358 -1.028 0.250 *** 0.358 -1.032 0.250 *** 0.356 -1.021 0.250 *** 0.360 
100 ± 499 -1.108 0.242 *** 0.330 -1.107 0.242 *** 0.331 -1.109 0.242 *** 0.330 -1.090 0.242 *** 0.336 
500 or more -1.413 0.272 *** 0.243 -1.412 0.272 *** 0.244 -1.392 0.272 *** 0.249 -1.370 0.273 *** 0.254 
Detection risk (Very small)                 
Fairly small -0.168 0.162  0.846 -0.167 0.162  0.846 -0.167 0.162  0.846 -0.157 0.162  0.855 
Fairly high -0.174 0.175  0.840 -0.174 0.175  0.840 -0.177 0.174  0.838 -0.167 0.174  0.846 
Very high 0.095 0.242  1.100 0.095 0.242  1.099 0.094 0.242  1.098 0.100 0.242  1.105 
Tax morality (Centred) 0.288 0.031 *** 1.334 0.288 0.031 *** 1.334 0.282 0.031 *** 1.326 0.287 0.031 *** 1.332 
State over-interference Index -0.054 0.042  0.947             
Implicit tax rate on labour 2012 (Centred)     -0.028 0.021  0.972         
Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 2013 (Centred)        -0.042 0.022 * 0.959     
State under-intervention Index             -1.247 0.435 *** 0.287 
N    8741    8741    8741    8741 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.2170*** 0.2142*** 0.1960*** 0.1515*** 
(Standard error) 0.0952 0.0945 0.0899 0.0773 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 6.19 6.11 5.62 4.40 
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Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to receive under-reported salaries - continued 
 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d 
Fixed part E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) E se(E)  Exp(E) 
Constant -3.173 0.402 *** 0.042 -3.120 0.404 *** 0.044 -3.089 0.399 *** 0.046 -3.100 0.403 *** 0.045 
Gender (Women)                 
Men 0.399 0.128 *** 1.491 0.398 0.128 *** 1.489 0.400 0.128 *** 1.493 0.402 0.128 *** 1.494 
Age (Centred age: 41) -0.020 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.020 0.005 *** 0.981 -0.019 0.005 *** 0.981 
Formal education (15 and under)                 
16-19 0.539 0.282 * 1.714 0.571 0.283 ** 1.770 0.513 0.282 * 1.671 0.566 0.283 ** 1.761 
20+ 0.182 0.308  1.200 0.202 0.308  1.224 0.177 0.307  1.194 0.211 0.308  1.235 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)                
From time to time -0.535 0.161 *** 0.586 -0.535 0.161 *** 0.586 -0.548 0.161 *** 0.578 -0.541 0.161 *** 0.582 
Almost never/never -1.090 0.177 *** 0.336 -1.106 0.178 *** 0.331 -1.125 0.176 *** 0.325 -1.113 0.177 *** 0.329 
Occupation (Employed position, at desk)                 
Employed professional 0.486 0.301  1.626 0.475 0.302  1.608 0.479 0.302  1.615 0.481 0.302  1.618 
General, middle management, supervisor etc. 0.201 0.253  1.222 0.188 0.253  1.207 0.195 0.253  1.216 0.196 0.253  1.216 
Employed position, travelling 0.807 0.247 *** 2.242 0.797 0.247 *** 2.219 0.812 0.247 *** 2.252 0.800 0.247 *** 2.225 
Employed position, service job 0.323 0.233  1.382 0.307 0.233  1.360 0.331 0.234  1.392 0.321 0.233  1.378 
Skilled manual worker 0.679 0.213 *** 1.972 0.668 0.213 *** 1.951 0.683 0.213 *** 1.981 0.678 0.213 *** 1.970 
Unskilled manual worker, etc. 0.571 0.282 ** 1.770 0.554 0.282 ** 1.740 0.580 0.282 ** 1.787 0.570 0.282 ** 1.768 
Company size (1-4 employees)                 
5 ± 9 -0.186 0.206  0.830 -0.177 0.206  0.838 -0.191 0.206  0.826 -0.183 0.206  0.833 
10 ± 19 -0.255 0.195  0.775 -0.243 0.195  0.784 -0.264 0.195  0.768 -0.252 0.195  0.777 
20 ± 49 -0.546 0.203 *** 0.579 -0.528 0.204 *** 0.590 -0.556 0.203 *** 0.573 -0.536 0.203 *** 0.585 
50 ± 99 -1.032 0.249 *** 0.356 -1.017 0.250 *** 0.362 -1.040 0.250 *** 0.353 -1.023 0.250 *** 0.360 
100 ± 499 -1.097 0.242 *** 0.334 -1.092 0.242 *** 0.335 -1.121 0.242 *** 0.326 -1.097 0.242 *** 0.334 
500 or more -1.382 0.272 *** 0.251 -1.386 0.273 *** 0.250 -1.411 0.272 *** 0.244 -1.387 0.273 *** 0.250 
Detection risk (Very small)                 
Fairly small -0.158 0.162  0.854 -0.162 0.163  0.850 -0.171 0.162  0.843 -0.163 0.162  0.850 
Fairly high -0.165 0.174  0.848 -0.171 0.174  0.843 -0.176 0.174  0.839 -0.172 0.174  0.842 
Very high 0.095 0.242  1.100 0.097 0.242  1.102 0.102 0.242  1.107 0.106 0.242  1.111 
Tax morality (Centred) 0.286 0.031 *** 1.332 0.288 0.031 *** 1.334 0.283 0.031 *** 1.327 0.287 0.031 *** 1.333 
Severe material deprivation 2013 (Centred) 0.028 0.010 *** 1.028             
Income inequality 2013 (Centred)     0.195 0.102 * 1.215         
Public expenditure on labour market interventions 2012 (Centred)       -0.230 0.105 ** 0.795     
Impact of social transfers 2013 (Centred)             -0.019 0.009 ** 0.981 
N    8741    8741    8741    8741 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.1653*** 0.2049*** 0.1789*** 0.1939*** 
(Standard error) 0.0798 0.0906 0.0858 0.0881 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 4.78 5.86 5.16 5.57 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. Indicators were centred to the mean obtained using weighting scheme. To avoid excessive 
influence, the GDP of Luxembourg was capped at 150 in the analyses presented here. For Public expenditure on labour market interventions, the latest available data were from 2010 for Greece and from 2011 for Cyprus and UK. 
For Impact of Social Transfer, the latest available data for Ireland were from 2012. 
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Figure 1 Cross-national variations in the propensity to under-report salaries in the EU-28: 
residual country effects within a 95 per cent confidence interval 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1. Correlations amongst the country level variables  
 GDP 
per 
capita 
in PPS 
2013 
European 
Quality of 
Government 
Index 2013 
Implicit 
tax rate 
on 
labour 
2012 
Current 
taxes on 
income, 
wealth, 
etc. 
2013 
Severe 
material 
deprivation 
2013 
Income 
inequality 
2013 
Public 
expenditure 
on labour 
market 
interventions 
2012 
European 
Quality of 
Government 
Index 2013 
0.886 
*** 
      
Implicit tax 
rate on labour 
2012 
0.401 
*** 
0.321 
*** 
     
Current taxes 
on income, 
wealth, etc. 
2013 
0.764 
*** 
0.870 
*** 
0.217 
*** 
    
Severe 
material 
deprivation 
2013 
-0.867 
*** 
-0.911 
*** 
-0.477 
*** 
-0.754 
*** 
   
Income 
inequality 
2013 
-0.544 
*** 
-0.580 
*** 
-0.472 
*** 
-0.385 
*** 
0.648 
*** 
  
Public 
expenditure 
on labour 
market 
interventions 
2012 
0.691 
*** 
0.665 
*** 
0.443 
*** 
0.586 
*** 
-0.630 
*** 
-0.319 
*** 
 
Impact of 
social 
transfers 2013 
0.647 
*** 
0.713 
*** 
0.227 
*** 
0.593 
*** 
-0.642 
*** 
-0.770 
*** 
0.438 
*** 
Significant at ***p<0.001 
 
 
